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Abstract
In this chapter, we provide some empirical evidence on whether
the effects monetary policy shocks on real output growth in the Euro
area depend upon the phase of the business cycle that the economy
was undergoing (the so-called state asymmetries). To do so, we fol-
low a two-step procedure: (i) first, we derive short-term interest rate
shocks from a Taylor rule which accounts for a nonlinearity in the
interest-rate setting behaviour of the central bank, and (ii) next, we
apply a multivariate version of Hamilton(1989)’s Markov switching
methodology to allow for different effects of interest-rate shocks on
real output growth in periods of high and low growth. Our findings
provide some support for the presence of this type of asymmetries,
whereby interest rate shocks have larger effects in recessions than in
expansions.
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1 Introduction
Our main goal in this chapter is to provide empirical evidence for the Euro-
area (EA, hereafter) on whether monetary policy shocks have had asymmetric
effects on real output growth depending on the phase of the business cycle
that the economy was undergoing during the period 1996-2003. More pre-
cisely, our objective is to test whether these effects are significantly different
in expansions and recessions. For this purpose, we follow the methodology
advocated by Garcia and Schaller (1995), Ravn and Sola (1996) and Dolado
and Maria-Dolores (2001) where the well-known Hamilton´s (1989) approach
to model univariate processes subject to stochastic regime shifts is extended
to a Multivariate Markov-Switching (MMS) framework.1 In this setup, real
output growth (directly) and the transition probabilities between cyclical
phases, are allowed to depend on shocks to a monetary- policy (Taylor) rule
describing the evolution of a short-term interest rate controlled by the mon-
etary authorities. Either the coefficients on these shocks or the transition
probabilities are themselves functions of the latent variable capturing regime
changes, providing in this way a flexible modelling framework where to im-
plement the above-mentioned test. The use of the MMS methodology is
appropriate to analyze the cyclical effects of changes in the monetary- policy
stance in the EA since, unlike what happens with the NBER dating for the
US cycle, an official dating for the EA cycle is not yet officially available.2
Hence, the MMS approach will enable us to address a number of interesting
issues ranging fromDo monetary policy shocks have different effects on output
depending on the phase in which the change in monetary policy took place?
to Do changes in the monetary policy stance alter the transition probabilities
from a recession to a boom and conversely?.
To measure the stance of monetary policy in the EA, a Taylor rule has
been estimated using monthly data for the period 1996(01)- 2003(12). The
choice of the sample size is dictated by the adoption of inflation targets by
central banks in most of the EA countries since the mid-1990s, following the
1Another related paper which, however, uses a different methodology (Smooth Tran-
sition Regression, STR, models) is Osborn et al. (2002) where the effects of monetary
policy on output in the UK are examined.
2However, non-official dating of the EA business cycle can be found in Artis et al.
(2004) and in the EUCOIN indicator of the Centre for Economic Performance (CEPR)
whose methodology is explained in Forni et al. (2005).
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collapse of the EMS in September 1992. Since the European Central Bank
(ECB) started its control of monetary policy in the EA in 1999, our implicit
operating assumption is that the national central banks conducted monetary
policy during the preparatory stages to the foundation of the ECB (under the
supervision of the European Monetary Institute created in 1994), with the
same principles that the ECB uses nowadays. To construct EA aggregates
before 1999, we have used the same aggregation procedure that is currently
used by the ECB, namely, GDP-weighted averages (measured in units of PPP
at 1995 prices) of: (i) the relevant short-term intervention interest rates in the
member countries of the EA, (ii) real output growth (measured by montlhly
growth rates of the Industrial Production Index, IPI), and (iii) inflation rates
(measured by the Harmonised Price Index, HCPI).
Accordingly, our econometric approach is a two-stage one. In the first
stage, a Taylor rule is estimated for the EA, as if a surrogate ECB was
exerting monetary policy control during the whole period under study. Thus,
the residuals of this reaction function will be interpreted as monetary- policy
( interest rate) shocks. A novel feature of this exercise is that, instead of
estimating the conventional (forward-looking) linear Taylor rule popularized
by Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), we estimate a nonlinear rule which accounts
for nonlinearity in the Phillips curve, given the ample evidence in favour of
this hypothesis.3 In the second stage, the shocks from the Taylor rule are
then used as explanatory variables in a MMS model in order to test the
existence of asymmetric effects of unanticipated changes in the monetary-
policy stance on real output growth depending on the phase of the business
cycle.
Proceeding in this fashion, we obtain two interesting results. First, evi-
dence is found in favour of state asymmetries at the aggregate level in the
3For instance, convexity in the short-run inflation-output gap trade-off arises under
the traditional Keynesian assumption that nominal wages are flexible upwards and rigid
downwards, giving rise to a convex aggregate supply schedule (see, e.g., Baily, 1978). More
recently, Akerlof et al. (1996) have further elaborated on that argument claiming that
even a long-run trade off exists at very low rates of inflation due to the existence of money
illusion on the part of the workers when there is price stability. Laxton et al. (1995,
1999) and Gerlach (2000) have presented evidence supporting a convex Phillips curve in
the inflation-output gap space for several European countries and the US. Schaling (1999),
Orphanides and Wieland (2000) and Dolado et al. (2005) are the first papers to consider
this type of nonlinearity in the derivation of optimal monetary policy rules.
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EA, whereby interest rate shocks have larger effects in recessions than in ex-
pansions. Second, we find that interest rate shocks also affect the transition
probabilities from one cyclical phase to another in a different way, namely,
an interest rate rise in a boom is less effective in allowing the economy to
become less expansionary than an equally-sized interest rate cut in helping
the economy to escape from a slump.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief overview of the literature dealing with asymmetries in the effects of
monetary-policy shocks on the real side of the economy. In Section 3, a
nonlinear forward-looking Taylor rule is estimated for the EA in order to
derive these shocks. Section 4 offers a brief explanation of the basics of the
MMS methodology which is used throughout the rest of the chapter, and
presents results for the effects of the shocks on real output growth rate in a
model with constant transition probabilities. Section 5 relaxes the previous
assumption by allowing the transition probabilities to be directly affected by
the shocks. Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions.
2 Related literature
There are three main types of asymmetries which have been discussed in the
literature about the effects of unanticipated monetary policy changes on real
output: (i) the traditional Keynesian asymmetry, associated with the sign
of the monetary shocks, (ii) the standard menu cost asymmetry related to
the size of those shocks, and (iii) the state asymmetry whereby the effects of
monetary shocks on output depend on the phases of the business cycle.
One can find a wide range of theoretical contributions in the literature
that provide microfoundations for these asymmetries. In relation to the sign
asymmetry, its rationale relies upon the nominal stickiness properties of menu
costs and has been examined, among many others, by Akerlof and Yellen
(1985). As for the size asymmetry, Ball and Romer (1989, 1990), Caballero
and Engel (1992) and Tsiddon (1991), inter alia, have analysed S-s threshold-
type price adjustment rules which lead to convex aggregate supply curves,
as in the standard Keynesian framework.
More recently, the possibility of having a hybrid asymmetry, according
to which only small negative shocks affect real output, has been considered
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as well in models which combine dynamic menu-costs with a positive trend
inflation rate. As Ball and Mankiw(1994) have argued, the underlying ex-
planation for that type of asymmetry is that, in the face of a positive trend
inflation rate, small negative shocks should bring the actual price closer to
the optimal value and the opposite should be expected when shocks are pos-
itive, either large or small. Consequently, in this case, firms will not adjust
their prices and, therefore, real effects will take place.
Empirical support for both types of asymmetries is well documented in the
literature. On the one hand, Cover (1992), De Long and Laurence (1998) and
Karras (1996) have found favourable evidence for the Keynesian asymmetry
in the US and a number of European countries. On the other hand, Ravn
and Sola (1996) and María-Dolores (2001) find strong evidence for both the
Keynesian and menu-cost asymmetries in the US and Spain, respectively.
Our aim in this chapter is restricted to the empirical analysis of state
asymmetries, namely, whether unanticipated changes in the monetary policy
stance affect real output differently in upturns than in downturns. Although
this type of asymmetry has received far less attention in the literature than
the other two asymmetries, there are at least two compelling arguments
which make them relevant. First, the previously discussed price- adjustment
models leading to a convex aggregate supply schedule could be re-interpreted
as implying that monetary policy will have stronger real effects during re-
cessions, when output is below its long-run level, than in expansions, when
the aggregate supply curve is almost vertical. And secondly, there is a broad
class of models which provide support for this type of asymmetry by explic-
itly modelling the credit or lending channel of the monetary transmission
mechanism. According to this interpretation, if financial markets face infor-
mation asymmetries, credit and liquidity may be readily available in booms
whilst agents may find it harder to obtain funds in slumps. Therefore, it
is likely that monetary policy will have stronger effects on the consumption
and investment decisions during upturns than during downturns. This is the
mechanism derived from the extensive research on financial market imper-
fections, including agency costs and debt overhang models, developed, inter
alia, by Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler (1988), Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1998) and Lamont (1993). As for the empirical
support of this type of asymmetry using the MMSmodelling approach, to our
knowledge, the only available studies are those by Ravn and Sola (1996) and
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García and Schaller(1995) who provide favourable evidence for state asym-
metries in the US , and Dolado and María-Dolores(2001) who find them
in Spain.4. Our contribution here will rely heavily upon the methodological
approach proposed in these papers.
3 Estimation of a monetary policy reaction
function
In this section, following the arguments in Dolado et al. (2005), we estimate
a nonlinear forward-looking Taylor rule for the ECB. The setup is as follows.
Let us suppose that the policymaker sets the nominal interest rate, i, with the
goal of minimizing inflation deviations from a target, eπ=π-π∗, and the output
gap, y˜ , in every period. Assuming a quadratic per-period loss function
in inflation and output performance, L(eπt, y˜t) = 12 [eπt2 + λy˜t2], and a fixed
discount rate δ, the policymaker´s objective in period t is to minimise the
expected present discounted value of the per-period losses:
Et
∞X
s=0
1
2
δsL(eπt+s, y˜t+s), (1)
subject to the following two equations describing the evolution of the econ-
omy:
πt+1 = πt + αf(y˜t) + uπ,t+1, (2)
with
f(y˜t) = y˜t + φy˜
2
t , y˜t >
−1
2φ
, (3)
and
y˜t+1 = βy˜t − ζrt + uy,t+1, (4)
4There is, however, a large literature on asymmetries in business cycles considered from
a univariate perspective. See, e.g., Neftci (1984), Beaudry and Koop (1993), Huh (1993)
and McQueen and Thorley (1993).
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where Et is the conditional expectations operator, δ and β ∈ [0, 1), and
uπ,t+1and uy,t+1 are zero-mean normally distributed shocks.
Equation (2) represents an accelerationist Phillips curve, or aggregate
supply (AS) schedule, where where the output gap enters in a nonlinear way,
as defined in equation (3). Note that the conventional linear AS schedule is
recovered when φ = 0, and that the function is convex (concave) if φ > 0
(< 0). As any AS schedule, it is assumed to be increasing ( 1 + 2φy˜ > 0) for
realistic values of φ and y˜t.5. Equation (4), in turn, represents an IS schedule
where the output gap exhibits sluggish adjustment, and depends on the real
interest rate (rt = it − Etπt+1). Notice that the real interest rate affects
output with one-period lag and, therefore, affects inflation with a two-period
lag. This timing convention, borrowed from Svensson (1997), is in line with
the extensive literature on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
which establishes that an innovation in monetary policy leads to a change
in output in the short run, with inflation only changing slowly later on (see
e.g., Christiano et al., 1999).
Totally differentiating (1) with respect to it, subject to (2)− (4) , yields
the following Euler equation:
λEty˜t+1 + λδβEty˜t+2 + δαEteπt+2(1 + 2φy˜t+1) = 0. (5)
Using (4) to replace Ety˜t+2 in terms of Ety˜t+1and Etrt+1, and solving for
the optimal value of i (denoted as i∗) in period t, implies that the policymaker
should set i∗t according to the following reaction function:
i∗t = c1Et−1eπt+1 + c2Et−1y˜t + c3Et−1(eπt+1y˜t), (6)
where the ci´s coefficients are functions from the set of structural parame-
ters (δ, α, λ, φ, ζand β).6
Our new monetary policy rule in (6) looks like a standard linear Taylor
rule except for the last term, namely, the expected interaction of current
output and future inflation. The presence of the interaction term in the
Euler equation above is quite intuitive. Take, for example, the case where
inflation is expected to be above its target at period t+1 by one percentage
5This is the case for the range of values of y˜ and the estimated value of φ in our sample.
6It can be shown that c1=1 + α/λζβ, c2=(1 + δβ
2)/δζβ, c3=2φα/λζβ.
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point. Then, the real interest rate will be below its equilibrium value at
period t which, in turn, causes a higher output gap at t + 1 and higher
inflationary pressure at t + 2. In the linear case, the policymaker increases
the interest rate by c1. However, if the Phillips curve is convex (φ > 0), then
the future inflationary pressure caused by the higher output gap will turn
out to be larger than in the linear case. The policymaker, anticipating this
higher pressure, captured by the interaction term, will react more forcefully
by implementing a larger rise in the interest rate, since in this case c3 > 0.
To estimate the policy rule, as is customary, we replace the expectations
in (6) by their realized values , yielding :
i∗t = cnst+ c1eπt+1 + c2y˜t + c3(eπt+1y˜t) + ξt. (7)
From the viewpoint of testing asymmetries in the monetary policy re-
action function what really matters is the c3 coefficient. This is the only
coefficient which embodies information on the nonlinear Phillips curve, so
that the restriction φ = 0 implies c3 = 0. Indeed, it is straightforward to
check that the ratio c3/2(c1 − 1) yields a direct estimate of φ. Hence testing
H0: φ = 0 is equivalent to testing H0 : c3 = 0 as long as c1 is different from
unity.7 Since (7) is linear in the coefficients, the key advantage of testing
directly H0 : c3 = 0 is that it does not require estimating a nonlinear model
in the parameters. As for the error term in (7), it is defined as:
ξt = −[c1(eπt+1 −Et−1eπt+1) + c2(y˜t −Et−1y˜t) + (8)
+c3(eπt+1y˜t − Et−1(eπt+1y˜t)],
where the term in brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and
therefore orthogonal to any variable in the information set available at (t−1).
Note that our specification is very similar to the one popularised by Clarida
et al. (1998, 2000) except for the inclusion of the interaction term between
inflation and the output gap. For estimation purposes, however, we will use
a slight modifications of equation (7) concomitant to the use of data with
a monthly frequency. First, in accord with most of the empirical literature,
we take one year (k = 12) to be the horizon used by the central bank in
7This is the case in our estimation below.
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forecasting inflation. And, secondly, as is also conventional, we use a lagged
dependent variable to capture interest-rate smoothing for which there are
several motivations in the literature. For this reason, the estimated rule will
be the following partial-adjustment model:
it = ρ1it−1 + (1− ρ1) i∗t + ξt. (9)
As is conventional in the estimation of Taylor rules, the estimation method
relies upon the choice of a set of instruments, Zt, from the set of variables
within the central bank´s information set, such as lagged variables that help
forecast inflation and output or any other contemporaneous variables that are
uncorrelated with the policy rule shock, ξt.
8 Then, the Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM ) can be used to estimate the parameter vector in (7) by
exploiting the set of orthogonality conditions E(ξt/Zt) = 0. Since the com-
posite disturbance ξt has an MA(k) representation, due to the overlapping
nature of the forecast errors, the Newey-West weighting var-cov matrix is
used to implement GMM. Finally, Hansen´s (1982) J test is used to test the
overidentification restrictions.
As explained in the Introduction, equation (9) is estimated using monthly
data for the Euro-area.9 The sample period, 1996(01)-2003(12), has been
chosen on the basis of selecting a sufficiently large sample size (96 observa-
tions) and a homogeneous recent spell where the implementation of monetary
policy by the national central banks before 1999 was fairly similar to that
conducted by the ECB later on. The short-term intervention interest rate
is chosen to be a weighted average of short-term intervention interest rates
for the Euro-area before 1999 and the Euro-area interest rate after Janu-
ary 1999. Inflation is measured through the HCPI inflation rate and output
through (logged) IPI since this is the only available measure of real output
on a monthly basis. All variables are seasonally adjusted and the IPI has
been corrected from calendar effects. To obtain a measure of output gap,
we detrend the (log of) IPI using the HP filter with a coefficient of 14.800.10
8The list of instruments is: a constant term, two lags of the interest rate, six lags of
the inflation rate, six lags of the output gap, four lags of the interaction between inflation
and output gaps and two lags of a (logged) raw materials price index.
9The data source is the OECD data base (www.sourceOECD.org)
10This coefficient is the default value in E-Views 5.0 for monthly data. Other values
in that range led to similar results, as did the residuals from adjusting a cubic trend to
logged output or from applying the band-pass filter of Baxter and King (1999).
9
Finally, as regards the inflation target, π∗, we use the official ECB target of
2%.
To get some preliminary evidence on the key channel for the nonlinear
Taylor rule in (7), Table 1 reports the results from the OLS estimation of the
nonlinear Phillips curve proposed in (3).11 The change in inflation at time
t, ∆πt, has been regressed on f(y˜t−1) to estimate the parameters α and φ.A
positive and statistically significant estimate of φ implies a convex Phillips
curve. As can be observed, there is favourable evidence to such a hypothesis.
To stress it, Figure 1 depicts the scatter plot of lagged output gap (horizontal
axis) against the change in inflation (vertical axis), together with the fitted
quadratic function, where it becomes clear than the curve is convex.
[TABLE 1]
[FIGURE 1]
Table 2, in turn, displays the estimated coefficients of (9). The coefficient
on the lagged interest rate (ρ1) is estimated to be 0.83, indicating a fairly
sluggish adjustment, in line with the available estimates in the literature.
The point estimate of c1 is always above unity which, as argued by Clarida
et al. (1998, 2000), implies an inflation-stabilising policy rule. Moreover,
the estimate of c2 is also strongly significant pointing out to a response of
the ECB to real activity, since the current output gap is a leading indicator
of future inflationary pressures. The most relevant result, however, is the
positive sign and high statistical significance of the estimate of c3, yielding
strong support to the existence of a nonlinear (convex) Phillips curve in the
EA. This result is in line with a similar finding by Dolado et al. (2005) for
the European Union using quarterly data for the period 1984-2001. Notice
that an estimate of φ can be retrieved from the ratio c3/2(c1−1) which yields
0.51, i.e., a value fairly similar to that reported in Table 1.12 Finally, it is
worth noticing that the p-value of the J-test (denoted as p-J in Table 2)
does not reject the over-identifying restrictions.
11In this and the remaining Tables, the superscripts ∗∗ ,∗, and † denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
12Indeed, using the delta method to compute 95% intervals of φ, we cannot reject the
null that the difference between both values is zero.
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Figure 2 depicts the short-term interest rate (solid line) together with the
Taylor rule predictions (dotted line). Note that the performance of the non-
linear Taylor rule is particularly striking since 1999, when the ECB started
its operations. However, before 1999, the rule slightly underpredicts although
it captures the fall in the interest rate.
[TABLE 2]
[FIGURE 2]
4 Markov switching models for real output
growth
In this section, we introduce the basic principles of the econometric modelling
approach which is applied to analyse the existence of asymmetries in the
effects of unanticipated monetary policy changes on real activity. We start
by presenting a brief overview of the basics of the MMS methodology in
relation to the conventional univariate approach popularized by Hamilton’s
(1989). Next, we explain how the state asymmetric effects of monetary policy
can be tested in this framework.
4.1 Extended Markov- Switching model including
interest-rate shocks
In line with the approach advocated by Ravn and Sola (1996), Garcia and
Schaller (1995) and Dolado and Maria-Dolores (2001) to investigate the pres-
ence of state asymmetries in the effects of monetary policy shocks on output,
we rely upon a MMS model. In this model, real output growth is allowed
to be affected by the interest rate shocks, ξt, obtained from equation (9) so
that their effects depend on the state of the economy.
As is well known, Hamilton’s MS univariate approach relies upon the
assumption that the actual state of the business cycle, i.e., a recession (r)
or an expansion (e), is determined by an unobserved latent random variable
which follows a Markov process. In Hamilton’s (1989), the growth rate of
output (µ) in the US economy was assumed to follow an AR(p) process whose
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unconditional mean (µ) and autoregressive coefficients (φi´s) were allowed to
vary as function of whether the economy was in an expansion (µe, φie) or in
a recession (µr, φir). We follow the same approach here. Yet, to estimate
the asymmetric effects of monetary policy shock (ξ) on output growth, the
AR(p) model is generalized to allow for the varying effects of the shocks in
the following way:
∆yt = φ1∆yt−1 + ...+ φp∆yt−p + µr(1− φ1 − ...− φp)+ (10)
∆µ(St − φ1St−1 − ...− φpSt−p)+
β1rξt−1 +∆β1St−1ξt−1 + ...+ βprξt−p +∆βpSt−pξt−p + σηt
where ∆y is the (monthly) IPI growth rate, ∆µ = µe − µr, St is the state
variable and ηt is distributed N(0, 1) normalized by its standard deviation,
σ. Further, ∆β = βe − βr, and βr and βe are the coefficients on the shocks
in recessions and expansions, respectively. Therefore, the chosen specifica-
tion implies that the effects of the shocks on output growth depend on the
business cycle phase that the economy was undergoing at the time the shock
took place.13 In order to account both for the lagged effects of shocks on
output growth and to define the shocks as predetermined variables in (10)
(see Filardo 1994), we set the contemporaneous effect of ξt on ∆yt equal to
zero. Finally, note that the autoregressive coefficients, φi, in (10) have been
assumed to be independent of St, since a LR test (with a p-value of 0.27)
did not reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy in this subset of
coefficients against state dependence.
As is conventional, the state variable in the model, St, is assumed to
follow a discrete-time Markov process which is characterized by the following
transition probability matrix Π:
·
prr
pre
per
pee
¸
=
·
prr
1− prr
1− pee
pee
¸
, (11)
13If instead of specifying the effects of the shocks as ∆βiSt−iξt−i (i = 0, .., p) in (10), we
were to introduce them in the form∆βiStξt−i, then the effects would depend on the current
state of the economy rather on the state at the time the shock took place. Estimation of
this alternative specification of the state dependence yields fairly similar results to those
presented in Table 3 below and therefore are omitted.
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where:
pij = Pr(St = j/St−1 = i), with
eX
j=r
pij = 1 for all i, (12)
such that pij is the probability of going from state i to state j (e.g., pre is
the probability of going from a recession to an expansion, etc.). Initially,
we assume that the transition probabilities are constant over time and are
determined by the following simple logistic specifications:
prr = Pr(St = r/St−1 = r) =
exp(θr)
1 + exp(θr)
(13)
pee = Pr(St = e/St−1 = e) =
exp(θe)
1 + exp(θe)
, (14)
where θr and θe denote the parameters that determine the probabilities of
being in a recession and in an expansion, respectively.
As Hamilton (1989) showed, the above assumptions allow us to obtain
a sequence of joint conditional probabilities Pr(St = i, ..., St−s = j/ Φt),
which are the probabilities that the output growth series is in state i or j
(i, j = r, e) at times t...t − s, respectively, conditioned by the information
available at time t. By adding those joint probabilities we can obtain the
so-called (smoothed) filter probabilities, namely, the probabilities of being in
states r or e at time t, given information available at time t:
Pr(St = j/Φt) =
eX
i=r
...
eX
j=r
Pr(St = i, ..., St−s = j/Φt), i,j = e,r, (15)
where Φt is the set of available information in period t. The smoothed filter
probabilities provide information about the regime in which the series are
most likely to have been in time t at every point in the sample. Therefore,
they turn out to be very useful tools for dating phase switches.
Table 3 report the estimates of the coefficients in (10), where four lags ( p
= 4) have been chosen on the basis of the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC)
information criteria. The first regime corresponds to a contractionary phase
with a monthly growth rate of −0.29% (−3.36% annually). while the second
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regime clearly corresponds to an expansionary phase with a monthly growth
rate of 0.38% (4.56% annually). As regards the probabilities of remaining in
each regime, they are estimated to be 0.89 for a recession and 0.94 for an
expansion14. These probabilities imply mean durations of 9.1 (slumps) and
16.7 (booms) pointing out that that recessions over the sample period tended
to be shorter than expansions15. Figure 3, in turn, depicts the smoothed
probabilities of a recession together with the monthly IPI growth rate. As can
be observed, these probabilities tend to have a strong inverse correlation with
the evolution of IPI growth so that they are high (low) when the growth rate
is negative (positive)16. Finally, from the viewpoint of this chapter, the most
relevant finding is that the sizes of the (negative) slopes of the shocks seem
to be larger in recessions than in expansions, pointing out to the existence
of state asymmetries. Indeed, a LR test of H0 : βir = βie(i = 1, 4) rejects
the null hypothesis of symmetric effects with a p-value of 0.008. This feature
is illustrated by Figure 4 which depicts the impulse-response functions of
output growth to a one-standard-deviation shock in ξt. It becomes clear the
output effects of an unanticipated rise in the interest rate are much stronger
in a contractionary than in an expansionary phase or, alternatively, that an
unanticipated rise of the interest rate in a boom is bound to reduce real
output growth by less than an equally-sized reduction of the interest rate
would increase output in a slump.
[TABLE 3]
[FIGURE 3]
[FIGURE 4]
Finally, the estimated MMS model can be used to forecast (monthly) IPI
growth by writing (10) in the vector AR(4) companion form:
∆yt = φ(L)∆yt−1 + µ(1− φ(L)) +∆µSt(I−φ(L)) (16)
+β(L)ξt−1+∆β(L)St−1ξt−1+σηt
14The probabilities have been computed as in (13) and (14).
15In Table 3, mean durations of recessions and expansions are denoted by dr and de,
respectively.
16The correlation coefficient is −0.80
14
such that,
∆yt+h/t = e1´ [φ(L)∆yt+h−1/t + µ(1−φ(L)) +∆µSt+h/t(1−φ(L)(17)
+β(L)ξt+h−1/t+∆β(L)St+h−1/tξt+h/t]
where L is the lag operator, φ(L) and β(L) are the corresponding matrices
in the companion form and e1´ = (1, 0.., 0). The autoregressive forecasts of
St+h/t = Π
hSt and ξt+h/t are obtained from the dynamic forecasts of the
Taylor rule in (9) using ARIMA processes to compute estimates of eπt+h+k,eyt+h and their interactions (eπt+h+k eyt+h). Table 4 presents the forecasts and
forecast errors of the (monthly) growth rate of IPI for the period 2003:01
to 2003:12. The RMSE of the forecasts is 0.114 which fares very well in
comparison with theRMSE obtained from simple AR (4) (0.512)and AR(12)
models (0.457), and also in relation to a re-estimated univariate MS model,
like the one in Table 3, but excluding the effects of the shocks (0.266).17
[TABLE 4]
5 Effects of Monetary Policy on State Switches
Whereas in the previous section we allowed for state dependence in the effects
of interest- rate shocks on output growth, the transition probabilities from
one phase to another were assumed to be independent of those shocks. Thus,
while we were able to test whether shocks had different incremental effects on
output in each state, we were not able to examine whether those shocks might
have a further effect on output growth by directly affecting the probability
of a state switch. In this section, we address this issue by allowing those
probabilities to depend directly on the shocks.18 Hence, the logit functions
in (13) and (14) are replaced by:
prr = Pr(St = r/St−1 = r) =
exp(θor + θ1rξt−1 + θ2rξt−2)
1 + exp(θor + θ1rξt−1 + θ2rξt−2)
(18)
17Hansen´s (1992) statistic to test constant linear autoregressive coefficients under the
null against the last MS model, excluding the shocks, yields a p-value of 0.017, therefore,
rejecting the null.
18The maximization algorithm with variable transition probabilities is considered in
Filardo (1994).
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pee = Pr(St = e/St−1 = e) =
exp(θoe + θ1eξt−1 + θ2eξt−2)
1 + exp(θoe + θ1eξt−1 + θ2eξt−2)
, (19)
where only two lags of ξt has been chosen in (18) and (19) to keep the
number of parameters manageable. Further, in order to isolate the effect
of the shocks from the linear effects examined above, the coefficients on
the latter terms (βir and βer) are constrained to be zero, as in García and
Schaller (1995) and Dolado and María-Dolores (2001).19 Notice that since
the probability of remaining in a recession (expansion) is increasing in the
θir(θie) parameters, we should expect θ1r and θ2r to be positive, and θ1e and
θ2e to be negative, when considering an interest rate rise. In other words, an
increase in the interest rate should reduce the probability of remaining in an
expansion and increase the probability of remaining in a recession.
The estimates of the coefficients in the MMS model with variable transi-
tion probabilities are reported in Table 5, where it can be observed that the
signs of the θir and θie coefficients are in agreement with the above interpreta-
tion. Furthermore, the restriction stemming from ignoring the linear effects
of shocks has a limited effect on the estimates of the probabilities pee and
prr, since the estimated intercepts (θ0r, θ0e) yield, according to (13) and (14),
pee = 0.90 and prr=0.87, namely, close values to the respective probabilities
(0.94 and 0.89) reported in Table 3.
[TABLE 5]
To ascertain the effects of interest rate shocks on the transition proba-
bilities, we use the following experiment. Suppose that the ECB were to
implement a negative (expansionary) interest rate shock of x basis points in
two consecutive months (from t to t + 2), in agreement with the number of
lags with which ξt appears to affect prr and pee in (18) and (19). Then, the
question would be: How would such a reduction in the interest rate affect
19Furthermore, attempts to estimate an encompassing model with state dependent prob-
abilities and state vaying effects of the shocks, as in (10), failed to achieve convergence of
the Filardo´s algorithm.
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the transition probability from a recession to an expansion?. Likewise, if, in-
stead, a positive (contractionary) interest rate shock of identical magnitude
were to be considered: How would such a rise in the interest rate affect the
probability of a converse switch?.
As an illustration of the proposed simulation, Table 6 shows the changes
in per (pre) in response to a positive(negative) interest rate shock of 100
b.p. (−100 b.p.). It is found that an unanticipated interest-rate cut of such
a magnitude will increase the probability of getting out from a recession
(pre) from 0.13 to 0.24 whereas an unanticipated rise in the interest rate
will increase the probability of entering a recession (per) from 0.10 to 0.16.
Note that, in accord with the stronger real effects of monetary policy during
recessions found before, the increase in the probability of escaping a recession
in response to a cut in interest rates is about twice as large as that the
reduction in the probability of entering a recession in response to a rise in
interest rates.
[TABLE 6]
6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated the possibility of asymmetric effects of
monetary policy shocks on real output growth in the EA depending on the
business cycle phase of the economy. This type of asymmetric effects are
known as state asymmetries, according to which the effects of monetary pol-
icy shocks on real activity may be stronger in recessions than in expansions.
The rationale for these asymmetries stems from an extensive theoretical re-
search which stresses financial market imperfections, including models which
deal with credit crunches and debt overhang, in the transmission mechanism
from monetary policy on output.
Our test of this asymmetry in the EA, using monthly data over the period
1996-2003, relies on a Markov-switching model of real output (IPI) growth
augmented with predetermined variables whose coefficients or the transition
probabilities are allowed to depend on the latent state variable which identi-
fies the cyclical phases. Our results here offer some support for the previous
17
hypothesis. In particular, we find that monetary policy shocks, measured
as shocks to the short-term interest rate obtained from a forward-looking
Taylor rule, have significantly larger effects during recessions than during
expansions, and that unanticipated interest- rate cuts help about twice more
to escape a recession than a corresponding rise in interest rates would help
to cool down the economy when it is undergoing an expansion.
Finally, as a by-product of our analysis, we have found significant evidence
of nonlinearity in the policy rule of the ECB, in the sense that it has tended
to intervene more vigorously when inflation and output move together above
their targets than what a linear Taylor rule would predict, particularly after
1999. This result could be interpreted in terms of the existence of a convex
Phillips curve in the EA.
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Table 1: Estimated Phillips Curve for Euro-zone
Coefficient Estimate
α 0.084∗
(0.024)
φ 0.583∗
(0.122)
Note: The figures in parenthesis are White’s standard errors.
Table 2. Estimated Taylor rule for Euro-zone
Coefficient Estimate
cnst 0.54∗∗
(0.10)
ρˆ1 0.83
∗∗
(0.03)bc1 1.40∗∗
(0.46)bc2 0.11∗∗
(0.02)bc3 0.41∗∗
(0.06)bσε 0.25
p− J 0.086
Notes: The figures in parentheses are standard errors.
p-J is the p-value of the J-test over-identifying restrictions
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Table 3
MMS model for IPI growth
Dependent variable ∆yt
Coefficient Estimate
µr
-.29∗
(.15)
µe
.38∗∗
(.12)
φ1
.15∗
(.07)
φ2
.39†
(.21)
φ3
.30†
(.17)
φ4
-.23
(.11)
β1r
-.13
(.11)
β1e
-.03
(.07)
β2r
-.52†
(.27)
β2e
-.09
(.21)
β3r
-.40∗
(.19)
β3e
-.29∗∗
(.13)
β4r
-.37∗
(.17)
β4e
-.22∗∗
(.08)
σ
.102∗∗
(.03)
θr
2.09∗∗
(.0.45)
θe
2.75∗∗
(.67)
dr 9.09
de 16.67
Log-Likelihood 75.67
Note: standard errors in parentheses
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Table 4
Forecasts of the IPI (monthly) growth rate (%): 2003
Month 03(01) 03(02) 03(03) 03(04) 03(05) 03(06)
Current -0.0790 0.0587 0.3142 -0.7665 0.1407 0.4138
Forecast -0.0917 0.0602 0.2530 -0.5551 0.2550 0.2635
For. Error 0.0127 -0.0015 0.0612 0.2114 -0.1080 0.1502
Month 03(07) 03(08) 03(09) 03(10) 03(11) 03(12)
Current -0.3204 0.1585 -0.5547 -0.3477 0.5589 -0.047
Forecast -0.1607 0.2902 -0.6417 -0.2592 0.4569 -0.122
For. Error -0.1597 -0.1317 0.0870 -0.0884 0.1010 0.0758
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Table 5
Markov Switching Model with variable transition
probabilities
Coefficient Estimate
µr
-.26∗∗
(.05)
µe
.35∗∗
(.01)
φ1
.37∗
(.14)
φ2
.23∗
(.12)
σ
.13∗∗
(.003)
θ0r
1.87∗∗
(.32)
θ1r
.47∗∗
(.05)
θ2r
.25∗∗
(.05)
θ0e
2.18∗∗
(.73)
θ1e
-.34∗∗
(.08)
θ2e -
-.18∗∗
(.05)
Log-Likelihood 77.21
Note: standard errors in parentheses
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Table 6
Effects of interest rates shocks on transition probabilities
a/ ξt = −100b.p.(t to t+2)
Monthly
Before After
prr 0.87 0.76
pre 0.13 0.24
b/ ξt = +100b.p.(t to t+2)
Before After
pee 0.90 0.84
per 0.10 0.16
30
